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Summary
The Arab League has maintained an official boycott of Israeli companies and
Israeli-made goods since the founding of Israel in 1948.  The United States actively
opposes the boycott and works on both bilateral and multilateral fronts to end it.  The
U.S. government also enforces laws that prohibit U.S. firms from participating in the
boycott.  This report will be updated as events warrant. 
The Arab League is an umbrella organization comprising 23 Middle Eastern and
African countries and entities.1  The League was founded in 1944, and in 1945 began a
boycott of Zionist goods and services in the British mandate territory of Palestine.  In
1948, following the war establishing Israel’s independence, the boycott was formalized
against the state of Israel and broadened to include non-Israelis who maintain economic
relations with Israel or who are perceived to support it.  The boycott is administered by
the Damascus-based Central Boycott Office (CBO), a specialized bureau of the Arab
League. 
The U.S. government has often been at the forefront of international efforts to end
enforcement of the boycott and to seek the Arab League’s revocation of it.  U.S.
legislative action related to the boycott dates from 1959 and includes multiple statutory
provisions expressing U.S. opposition to the boycott, usually in foreign assistance
legislation.  In 1965, mandatory reporting of any requests for U.S. companies to
participate in the boycott was adopted.   In 1977, Congress passed laws making it illegal
for U.S. companies to cooperate with the boycott and authorizing the imposition of civil
and criminal penalties against U.S. violators.  In addition, taxpayers who cooperate with
the boycott are subject to the loss of tax benefits that the U.S. government provides to
exporters.  U.S. regulations define cooperating with the boycott as: (1) agreeing to or
actually refusing to do business in Israel or with a blacklisted company; (2) agreeing to
or actually discriminating against other persons based on race, religion, sex, national
origin or nationality; (3) agreeing to or actually furnishing information about business
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relationships in Israel or with blacklisted companies; and (4) agreeing to or actually
furnishing information about the race, religion, sex, or national origin of another person.
  
 The U.S. government participates in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with
Arab League members regarding the boycott.  Members of Congress periodically
introduce legislation condemning the boycott and calling for increased antiboycott efforts.
Most recently, Representative Clay Shaw introduced a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res.
370) expressing the sense of Congress that Saudi Arabia, which joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2005, is not living up to its WTO commitments by continuing to
support the boycott. The resolution passed the House unanimously on April 5, 2006. 
Status of the Boycott and its Enforcement
There are three tiers to the boycott.  The primary boycott prohibits the importation
of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting countries.  The secondary boycott
prohibits individuals, as well as private and public sector firms and organizations, in
member countries from engaging in business with any entity that does business in Israel.
The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such firms.  The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or individual that has
business dealings with U.S. or other firms on the Arab League blacklist.
The Arab League does not enforce the boycott itself and boycott regulations are not
binding on  member states.  However, the regulations have been the model for various
laws implemented by member countries.   Under the League’s recommendations, member
countries should demand certificates of origin on all goods acquired from suppliers to
ensure that such goods meet all aspects of the boycott.   
Overall enforcement of the boycott by member countries is sporadic.  Some Arab
League members have limited trading relations with Israel.  The Arab League does not
formally or publicly state which countries enforce the boycott and which do not.  Some
Arab League member governments have maintained that only the Arab League, as the
formal body enforcing the boycott, can revoke the boycott.  Nonetheless, adherence to the
boycott is an individual matter for each Arab League member and enforcement varies by
state. 
 There are indications that some member countries publicly support the boycott while
continuing to quietly trade with Israel.  According to Doron Peskin, head of research at
InfoProd, a consulting firm for foreign and Israeli companies specializing in trade to Arab
states, “the Arab boycott is now just lip service.”2  This sentiment has been echoed by
Arab officials, albeit anonymously.  One official commented to the Egyptian newspaper
Al-Ahram that, “boycotting Israel is something that we talk about and include in our
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official documents but it is not something that we actually carry out — at least not in most
Arab states.”3
Others note that enforcement of the boycott waxes and wanes with the level of
intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian issue and that currently interest in boycott enforcement
among Arab countries may be increasing.  A possible harbinger of increased boycott
activity was a March 2006 meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Saudi
Arabia which brought together officials from several Middle Eastern foreign ministries
to discuss measures, regulations, and conditions for boycotting Israeli products.4
Some states and entities have formally ended the boycott, or at least some aspects
of it.  Egypt (1979), the Palestinian Authority (1993), and Jordan (1994) signed peace
treaties or agreements that ended the boycott.5   Mauritania, which never applied the
boycott, established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1999.   In addition, Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia do not enforce the boycott.6  In 1994, the member countries of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates — announced that they would only enforce the primary boycott
and  in 1996, recognized that total elimination of the boycott is a necessary step for peace
and economic development in the region.  However, U.S. companies continue to receive
requests to cooperate with the boycott from GCC member countries.
Since the boycott is sporadically applied and ambiguously enforced, its effectiveness,
measured by capital or revenue denied to Israel by companies adhering to the boycott, is
difficult to measure.  The effect of the primary boycott appears limited since intra-regional
trade is small.7  Nonetheless, there is some limited trade between Israel and its Arab
neighbors.  In 2004, according to the Manufacturers Association of Israel (IMA), Israeli
exports to Arab countries (mainly Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority) totaled
$192 million.8  Enforcement of the secondary and tertiary boycotts have decreased over
time reducing their effect.  This can be seen by a 1996 study that looked at the effect of
the Arab boycott on the Israeli economy through the automobile market.  Following a
relaxation of boycott enforcement in the late 1980s through the early 1990s, foreign
countries began exporting cars to Israel for the first time.   The study found that if the
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boycott had continued to be enforced, and these cars did not enter the Israeli market, the
Israeli car market would have been 12% smaller leading to a $790 price increase per car.
Total welfare loss for the study year, 1994, would have been $89 million.9  Thus it
appears that since intra-regional trade is small, and that the secondary and primary
boycotts are not aggressively enforced, the boycott does not currently have an extensive
effect on the Israeli economy. 
U.S. Activity to End the Arab League Boycott of Israel
The U.S. government officially opposes the boycott and works to end its
enforcement.  For many years, language has been included in the foreign operations
appropriations acts concerning the boycott.  Section 535 of the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-102), states
that: (1) it is the sense of Congress that the Arab League boycott is an impediment to
peace in the region and to United States investment and trade in the region; (2) the boycott
should be revoked and the CBO disbanded; (3) all Arab League states should normalize
relations with Israel; and (4) the President and the Secretary of State should continue
vigorously to oppose the boycott and encourage Arab states to assume normal trading
relations with Israel.  U.S. embassies and government officials raise the boycott with host
country officials, noting the persistence of illegal boycott requests and the impact on both
U.S. firms and on the countries’ ability to expand trade and investment.  
The U.S. government also works to end the boycott through negotiating bilateral
trade agreements and through WTO accession agreements.  In 2005 and 2006,
respectively, Bahrain and Oman agreed to drop the boycott as a provision of their free
trade agreements (FTA) with the United States.  The United States is also negotiating an
FTA with the United Arab Emirates, and their enforcement of the boycott has  been a
contentious issue during the negotiations.  Finally, Saudi Arabia officially dropped the
boycott as a condition of joining the World Trade Organization in December 2005.
However, it appears that these countries may continue to sporadically enforce the boycott
despite their pledges to abandon it.  U.S. companies continue to receive requests to
participate in the boycott from all of these countries, and Saudi Arabia has discussed
increasing boycott efforts against Israel despite their WTO obligations.10 
U.S. Antiboycott Laws.  The United States passed antiboycott legislation in the
late 1970s  to discourage U.S. individuals from cooperating with the secondary and
tertiary boycotts.11  These laws are currently included in the Export Administration Act
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of 1979 (EAA) and the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA).12
The export-related antiboycott provisions are administered by the Department of
Commerce and prohibit U.S. persons from participating in the boycott. The Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) administers tax-related antiboycott regulations that deny tax
benefits to U.S. taxpayers that participate in the boycott.  
Export-Related Antiboycott Legislation.   Regulations included in section 8
of the EAA prohibits any U.S. person or company from complying with an unsanctioned
foreign boycott and requires them to report requests to comply with a boycott they have
received.  Such requests must be reported quarterly to the Department of Commerce’s
Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC) in the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
These regulations are implemented in part 760 of the Department of Commerce’s Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).   
The EAA prescribes penalties that may be imposed for violation of the antiboycott
regulations.  Civil penalties for violating the antiboycott provisions are a maximum fine
of $10,000 per violation and a potential loss of export privileges for a period of time.
Particularly egregious cases may be referred to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution. Criminal penalties imposed for each violation can include a fine of up to
$50,000 or five times the value of the exports involved, whichever is greater, or
imprisonment for up to five years, or both.  Willful violations, where the violator has
knowledge that the items are also intended for any country to which exports are restricted
for national security or foreign policy purposes, are punishable by fines up to $250,000
or imprisonment for up to ten years. 
The Commerce Department reports that between October 2004 and September 2005,
U.S. individuals reported 1,037 requests for boycott information from 20 countries,
including both members and non-members of the Arab League (Table 2).  The UAE is
the largest requester of compliance with the boycott with 408 requests during the time
period.
Table 2. Boycott Requests Received by U.S. Companies 
(October 2004 - September 2005)
Country Number of Requests to Comply withthe Secondary and Tertiary Boycotts 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 408
Other (Algeria, India, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria,
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Source:  Department of Commerce.
In 2005, the Commerce Department reported closing cases against five companies
for violations of U.S. antiboycott laws.  The violations included furnishing prohibited
business information to boycott-enforcing countries and failing to report boycott-related
requests.  The civil penalties ranged from $6,000 to $22,5000 and totaled $57,500.  In
addition, it appears that one criminal penalty was imposed: a $500,000 fine on Maine
Biological Labs for complying with the boycott and other violations of IEEPA.
Tax-Related Antiboycott Legislation. The Ribicoff Amendment to the TRA
added section 999 to the Internal Revenue Code.  This section denies various tax benefits
normally available to exporters if they participate in the boycott.  In addition, the IRS
requires U.S. taxpayers to report operations in, with, or related to countries that the
Treasury Department includes on their annual list of countries that may require
participation in an international boycott, and with any other country from which they
receive a request to participate in a boycott.13
Denying tax benefits to U.S. firms that participate in the boycott appears to be an
effective antiboycott strategy.  According to one study, U.S. legislation reduces overall
participation in the boycott by U.S. taxpayers by between 15 and 30%.14  However, the
effectiveness of U.S. antiboycott tax legislation  may diminish since the U.S. government
is reducing export tax benefits that are available to U.S.-based companies due to
complaints brought to the WTO by the European Union.15
